I know as about as much about game theory as I do about auto mechanics, but I read an article about the prisoner’s dilemma and it stuck with me. By contrast, I am of the opinion that if the oil really needed changing, the car would simply stop.
In the prisoner’s dilemma, two accomplices are arrested for a crime. The police officers interview them individually. The men have no opportunity to communicate with one another. The police offer each suspect the same choice: he can receive immunity and testify against his accomplice, who will be given a ten-year sentence. Alternatively, he can stay silent. If the men stay silent, both receive a six-month sentence on a minor charge. Both men betraying one another would result in a two year sentence for each man. The choices boil down to cooperating with the partner or defecting. The dilemma is that neither man knows for certain what choice the other will make.
The solution that maximizes their total welfare is if they both cooperate and do not betray one another. They serve their six months and then are free to pursue their nefarious activities or write a tell-all book about prison life. However, each man knows that the other has a personal incentive to defect and rat him out. No matter what the other person does, a suspect will gain by defecting. If his (obviously now former) friend did not do the same, the suspect will get no jail time. If his partner also defected, then at least he only serves two years as opposed to ten. The ground-breaking, Nobel-prize winning conclusion is that self-interest will motivate people to defect (this of course was later contradicted by ground-breaking, Nobel-prize winning rebuttal demonstrating motivation to cooperate).
Even with no walls and cells, people in Congo assume that others will cheat the system and defect. They therefore defect as well, even at the cost of collective welfare. In this context it makes sense to maintain your army even if you are running for office. Your opponent is doing the same. Disbanding them now might leave you holding the bag with the proverbial ten-year sentence.
The cops do not trust the government to send paychecks. Neither do the soldiers. In this dilemma, they actually are damn near certain the government will defect rather than cooperate, so they had best do the same to minimize their loss by preying on civilians. The people through whom government money passes each take a cut because everyone else does. The only actions people can depend on in Congo are ones driven by self-interest. Cops harassing civilians on the street, governors commandeering NGO vehicles, people stealing bridge materials, generals giving false information, staff pilfering from employers…these are not the problems. They are certainly problems, but they are not THE problem. They are symptoms of the overall problem: an absence of trust causing mass defection rather than cooperation, at the expense of collective welfare.
The elections in Congo are no magic bullet precisely because the prisoner’s dilemma will still exist. It will continue until people have faith that others will not try to cheat the system. A democratic government will only be effective to the extent that defectors are punished and cooperators rewarded. People must trust one another. I should really look up that theory on coorperation, since apparently, it would have the answer.
This is my two cents for the day. Having been working a lot on a book about my experiences in Congo, I've been neglecting this little blog, so I'm stealing from some recent work and posting it.
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
8 comments:
Brilliant. That's a bloody good article right there.
You've just done the impossible - cogently explained the overall self-destructive activity in the Congo as a form of logical self-interest. Can I reserve an advance copy of your book?
The cops do not trust the government to send paychecks.....
A country's painting in a few lines. Exellent.
I would be careful with The Prisoner's Dilemma. It applies to everything: Cuba-Florida; girl-boy; Christian-Muslims; Sarah-Engine oil.
Gread read and write! I'd say if I didn't know any better that you'd been living in Kenya or Uganda. Your line, "the dilemma is that neither man knows for certain what choice the other will make, only fits so perfectly. Enjoyed stumbling onto here!
Congo is certainly doomed, but so are several corrupted countries in the world. What's the solution? Invading these countries and install ficticious democraties? Leave them alone until they evolve on their own?
Congo is certainly doomed, but so are several corrupted countries in the world. What's the solution? Invading these countries and install ficticious democraties? Leave them alone until they evolve on their own?
"...defectors are punished and cooperators rewarded. People must trust one another." Exactly. That's the only way Congo and the rest of Africa can move forward.
Usually a prisoner's dilemma with more than two participants is referred to as a tragedy of the commons. For example, if you have an agricultural community whose members all own grazing cattle, and only one common area for grazing, common defect would lead to common demise. Individual defect, on the other hand, is tempting because it would lead to individual success. One of the ways to curtail the problem is to make sure the grazing area is in common view, so that everyone knows when someone takes more than his share. In other words, one way to avoid the tragedy of the commons is to build in a punishment for tolerating defection. People need to feel the damage that is done by another's defection before they can be relied upon to do anything about it.
Post a Comment